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Previous research has shown an association between emotions, particularly social 
emotions, and moral judgments. Some studies suggested an association between blunted 
emotion and the utilitarian moral judgments observed in patients with prefrontal lesions. 
In order to investigate how prefrontal brain damage affects moral judgment, we asked a 
sample of 29 TBI patients (12 females and 17 males) and 41 healthy participants (16 
females and 25 males) to judge 22 hypothetical dilemmas split into three different 
categories (non-moral, impersonal and personal moral). The TBI group presented a 
higher proportion of affirmative (utilitarian) responses for personal moral dilemmas 
when compared to controls, suggesting an atypical pattern of utilitarian judgements. We 
also found a negative association between the performance on recognition of social 
emotions and the proportion of affirmative responses on personal moral dilemmas. 
These results suggested that the preference for utilitarian responses in this type of 
dilemmas is accompanied by difficulties in social emotion recognition. Overall, our 
findings suggest that deontological moral judgments are associated with normal social 
emotion processing and that frontal lobe plays an important role in both emotion and 
moral judgment. 
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1  Introduction 
For decades, moral psychology was dominated by Kantian-like rationalist theories that 
emphasized the role of conscious reasoning in the moral judgments of adults (Kohlberg, 
1981; Piaget, 1932; for a recent review on moral reasoning, see Paxton & Greene, 
2010). More recently, empirical researches suggested that moral judgment is 
predominantly intuitive, partly based on automatic emotional responses that are 
effortless and produced by unconscious processes. According to these perspectives, 
emotional processes play a crucial role in human decision making, including moral 
decisions (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Keltner, Horberg, & Oveis, 
2006; Moll, Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger, 2003; Slovácková, & Slovacek, 2007). The 
emotion based accounts of moral decision making draws support from a variety of 
empirical work, including behavioural and neuroimaging studies (Koenigs et al., 2007). 
For instance, several studies with clinical groups with brain focal lesions (see, for 
example, Anderson, Barrash, & Bechara, 2006) reveal an association between impaired 
emotional processing and disturbances in moral behaviour. Behavioural studies suggest 
that the manipulation of emotional states can influence the judgments in some moral 
situations (see, for example, Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). In 
their neuroimaging study, Koenigs and colleagues (2007) show that moral decision 
making tasks activate the same brain areas involved in emotions processing. 
The impairment of emotional behaviour has been commonly observed in patients with 
focal brain injuries (Greene et al., 2001; Greene, Turner, & Thompson, 2004; Milders et 
al., 2008; Moll et al., 2003; Prehn et al., 2007); specifically, patients with frontal lesions 
demonstrate a diminished emotional responsivity and an inadequate coping with anger 
and frustration in specific circumstances (Koenigs et al., 2007). This behavioural 
dysfunction appears to be related to a difficulty in processing specific social emotions 
(e.g., compassion, shame and guilt) that are closely linked to moral values (Adolphs, 
2001; Adolphs, Baron-Cohen, & Tranel, 2002, Damasio et al., 2000; Eslinger, 1998). 
Despite these deficits regarding emotional regulation and response, frontal patients 
preserve their logical reasoning and declarative knowledge of social and moral norms 
(Burgess et al., 2006; Koenigs et al., 2007). In this sense, some frontal patients preserve 
intellectual abilities (for example, fund of general information, ability to repeat and 
reverse digits, mental arithmetic, verbal reasoning, nonverbal problem solving, verbal 
and visual anterograde memory, visuospacial perception, academic achievement) and 
maintain factual knowledge of social conventions and moral rules (Anderson et al. 
2006). Interestingly, besides an inadequate emotional processing, an atypical pattern of 
moral judgements has also been observed in this clinic population (Eslinger, 1998; 
Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2009; Greene, & Haidt, 2002; Koenigs et al., 2007; 
Mendez, & Shapira, 2009; Moll et al., 2003). 
The experimental study of moral judgement has frequently relied on the analysis of 
subject reactions to moral dilemmas, fictional social situations specifically designed to 
pit two alternative actions against each other; the choice will inevitably disfavour one of 
the parties involved in the dilemma (Greene & Haidt, 2002). Dilemmas are often 
subdivided into three categories: non-moral, impersonal moral and personal moral. A 
non-moral dilemma requires a decision that never involves a moral violation. In a moral 
dilemma the subject must typically choose between act and an omission, with the 
omission leading to greater harm. Green and colleagues (2004) distinguished between 
“personal” and “impersonal” moral violations. They consider a moral violation to be 
“personal” if it meets three criteria: “First, the violation must be likely to cause serious 
bodily harm. Second, this harm must befall a particular person or set of persons. Third, 
the harm must not result from the deflection of an existing threat onto a different party 
(Greene et al, 2004, p. 389).” These three criteria can be expressed in terms of “ME 
HURT YOU”. The “hurt” criterion picks out the most primitive kinds of harmful 
violations; “you” criterion ensures that the victim is vividly represented as an 
individual; and the “me” captures a notion of “agency”, requiring that the action springs 
in a direct way from the agent’s will, that it be “authored” rather than merely “edited” 
by the agent. A moral violation is impersonal if it fails to meet these three criteria. 
Another important distinction between personal and impersonal moral dilemmas relates 
to their emotional level: personal moral dilemmas are characterized by high level of 
emotional intensity. Personal dilemmas are particularly intense because the moral 
violation option also represents an utilitarian response. From the utilitarian perspective, 
the morally correct course of action is the one that produces the greatest total benefit for 
all people affected (Choe & Min, 2011). In personal dilemmas, the utilitarian option 
involves a direct harmful action towards a specific individual that will favour the 
collective welfare; the internal conflict results from the strong emotional aversion to this 
utilitarian response and the consequent tendency to omit it. Securing the welfare of the 
collective by sacrificing a single person individual might be the ultimate moral goal of a 
society, however to choose this utilitarian option appears to be far from natural in 
normal individuals. 
Brain damaged patients with impaired emotion processing often produce an abnormally 
utilitarian pattern of judgments on moral dilemmas. For example, patients with frontal 
lesions seem to choose to suffocate their own child in order to save a group of people 
who otherwise would die, including the baby (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 
2004; Koenigs et al., 2007). Apparently, these patients often decide to secure the 
welfare of the collective even if it means sacrificing someone dear to them, an 
utilitarism attitude that suggest a diminished emotional responsivity. Anderson, Barrash, 
and Bechara (2006) argue that the abnormally high rate of utilitarian judgments 
observed in frontal brain injured patients with deficits in emotional response suggests 
that their decisions are mostly cognitive, intentional and conscious, uncontaminated by 
emotion. Functional neuroimaging studies of emotion recognition and moral judgment 
tasks highlight the pre-frontal cortex as dominant in the regulation of emotional 
behaviour as well as morality (Greene et al., 2004). 
The frontal lesion patients reveal idiosyncratic response patterns to some dilemmas 
when compared to patients with lesions in other brain regions (Slovácková, & Slovacek, 
2007). Several studies further investigating which regions in the frontal cortex would be 
dominant for judging moral actions led to little consensus among researchers. For 
example, Green and colleagues (2004) suggest that ventromedial (VMPFC), 
dorsolateral (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate (AC) cortex are involved in judging 
personal moral dilemmas, while Koenigs and colleagues (2007) postulate that the 
ventromedial (VMPFC) region is responsible not only for judgment of this type of 
dilemmas but also for processing more complex emotions (i.e., social emotions such as 
guilt or shame). Actually, both authors recognize the unique contributions of all three 
regions that together are relevant to moral judgments: VMPFC responsible for 
emotional responding; AC for cognitive conflict and DLPFC for the abstract reasoning. 
Studies focusing on hemispheric dominance for emotion processing and moral 
judgment also provided little consensus. In order to understand whether the 
lateralization of the prefrontal cortex lesions leads to response differences in moral 
dilemmas with high emotional level, Tranel and colleagues (2002) and Young and 
colleagues (2006) examined subjects with unilateral and bilateral lesions. Both studies 
reported worse performance in patients with right and bilateral prefrontal cortex lesions. 
Following this line of research, Mendez and Shapira (2009) also concluded that subjects 
with right frontal cortex lesions showed an inadequate response pattern for emotion 
processing and abnormal judgment of personal moral dilemmas. These results seem to 
converge on the idea that frontal cortex has a neuronal circuit for “morality”, with 
predominance in the right hemisphere. 
Regardless of which region in the prefrontal cortex is more dominant for moral 
judgments, evidence shows that damage to the prefrontal cortex impairs social and 
emotional behaviour, leading inevitably to some degree of social isolation. This pattern 
becomes more severe over time because social opportunities become scarcer and 
cognitive rehabilitation is nearly nonexistent (Bornhofen, & McDonald, 2008). 
Although several studies have examined emotional and behavioural changes in brain 
damaged patients, few studies pursued these changes specifically in frontal lesion 
subjects or investigated the possible association between social emotion processing and 
moral judgment. It is thus our first goal to compare the performance of frontal TBI 
patients with a group of healthy subjects on a moral judgment task. As a secondary 
objective, we ask whether TBI patients’ performance on the task differs when 
hemispheric lesion location (right, left, bilateral) and specific damaged prefrontal cortex 
region were considered. Since literature describes an association between adequate 
social emotion processing (e.g., compassion, shame, guilt) and judgment of moral 
dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007), our third aim is to analyze participants’ (TBI patients 
and controls) performance on a social emotion recognition ask and ask whether it 
correlates with utilitarian responses in moral dilemmas. This association may help us to 
understand the emotional and behavioural changes observed in subjects who suffered 
traumatic brain injury. 
1.1  Material and methods 
 
Table 1: Distribution of TBI patients according brain lesion localization. 
Brain lesion localization N % 
Hemisphere     
Right anterior frontal 8 27.6 
Left anterior frontal 10    34.5 
Bilateral 6 20.7 
Left frontal / Anterior temporal 1   3.4 
Right frontal / Anterior temporal 1   3.4 
Frontal bilateral / Anterior temporal 2   6.9 
Right frontal / Posterior occipital 1   3.4 
Frontal     
Orbitofrontal 8 27.6 
Medial 3 10.3 
Dorsolateral 18    62.1 
 
1.2  Participants 
1.2.1  TBI group 
Twenty-nine Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) patients (17 male and 12 female) were 
assessed, with a mean age of 29.31 years (SD = 5.89) and mean number of years of 
education of 12.10 (SD = 3.25). On average, the post-traumatic period was 6.68 years 
(SD = 3.60). TBI patients were contacted in a private neurosurgical clinic in Algarve (n 
= 25) and at the Neurosurgical Department of Hospital of São José in Lisbon (n = 4) and 
invited to participate. The inclusion criteria were: (1) clinical diagnosis of frontal 
traumatic brain injury, (2) within 12 months or more, and (3) post-traumatic amnesia 
less than 24 hours. Exclusion criteria were: (1) previous clinical history of psychiatric 
disorder, (2) non-frontal traumatic brain injury, and (3) age over 40 years-old. From the 
43 patients initially selected, 14 were excluded (six abandoned the experiment due to 
fatigue and physical indisposition, five did not show images of significant frontal brain 
damage and three were excluded due to technical failures during data collection). In 
order to get a more precise characterization, our TBI participants were submitted to a 
structural magnetic resonance imaging, being all of them tested with a Philips 1.5 Intera 
Scanner using the same image protocol.
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 Subsequently, two independent judges (a 
neurosurgeon and a neuroradiologist) rated neuroimaging data for lesion location with 
the following grid criteria: frontal (anterior or posterior), frontal (orbitofrontal, medial, 
and dorsolateral), parietal (anterior or posterior), temporal (anterior or posterior) and 
occipital (anterior or posterior). Each lesion was characterized using the rules of 
abnormal focal signals (hypointense, hyperintense or mixed) (Table 1). 
1.2.2  Control group 
Forty-one healthy participants (25 male and 16 female) were recruited for this 
experiment and matched to TBI participants on age and years of education. Exclusion 
criteria included: (1) history of neurological disease; (2) self-reported depression and (3) 
history of traumatic brain injury. The mean age for the control participants was 27.98 
years (SD = 5.73) and the mean number of years of education was 12.68 (SD = 3.66). 
1.3  Cognitive and clinical assessment 
Participants were submitted to cognitive assessment through several tests: (1) Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices; (2) Wechsler Memory Scale; (3) Verbal Fluency Test 
(participants had to say as many name of animals as possible during 60 seconds); (4) 
Familiar Faces Recognition Test (naming task with three sub-tests: age, occupation and 
emotion perception of some familiar Portuguese’s faces); and (5) Trail Making Test—
Part B. In addition, participant’s depression levels were evaluated using the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) and TBI participants’ also respond to a Social and 
Emotional Maladjustment Scale (MSS), a seven items scale, specially developed for the 
present study (total score ranging from 7—absence of social maladjustment—to 49 —
intense maladjustment; Cronbach’s alpha =.73). 
The tests were applied in the same order and allow us to characterize participants’ 
cognitive functions and to evaluate potential confounding effects when evaluating group 
differences. 
Table 2 reports means and standard deviation for cognitive results of both groups. The 
comparison between groups confirmed that they did not differ in any of the cognitive 
variables, except for Famous Faces Recognition Test, where the control group scored 
significantly higher (Cohen’s d indicating a large effect size). Furthermore, this 
difference was observed only when the TBI participants had to identify the emotional 
state of the famous face. There was also a statistically significant large difference 
between groups for depressive symptoms. TBI group presented higher scores for BDI, 
indicating more significant depressive symptoms compared to control group. On the 
Social and Emotional Maladjustment Scale, the TBI group showed relative high scores 
of social maladjustment (mean of 34.9, out of a maximum possible of 49 points). 
 
Table 2: Sociodemographic, clinical and cognitive characterization of TBI and control 
groups. 
  
TBI group (N 
= 29) 
M (SD) 
Control group 
(N = 41) 
M (SD) 
Cohen’s d Mann-Whitney p 
Sociodemographic         
Age 29.31 (5.89) 27.98 (5.73) 0.23 .346 
Years of education 12.10 (3.25) 12.68 (3.66) −0.17     .497 
Years of TBI   6.68 (3.70) N/A     
Clinical         
BDI   2.10 (0.77) 1.17 (0.38) 1.53       .000*** 
MSS 34.86 (6.03) N/A     
Cognitive         
PMR 75.34 (16.47) 78.05 (17.02) −0.16     .509 
WMS 86.48 (12.36) 91.29 (8.79) −0.44     .062 
TMT (seconds) 
128.72 
(45.25)   
120.44 (51.79) 0.17 .489 
TMT (errors)   1.13 (1.97) 0.95 (1.92) 0.09 .694 
VFT 21.79 (5.53) 24.20 (5.39) −0.44     .074 
Total FFRT   8.03 (2.36) 10.39 (1.07) −1.29           .000*** 
Note: BDI: Beck Depression Inventory (1: Inexistent or minimal Depression; 2: Minor 
depression; 3: Moderated Depression; and 4: Severe Depression); PMR: Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices (0–9: Very Inferior, I; 10–14: Inferior, II-; 15–24: Inferior, II; 25–
49: Medium, III-; 50–74: Normal, III+; 75–84: Good, IV; 85–89: Good, IV+; 90–94: 
Very Good, V; 95–100: Very Good, V+); WMS: Wechsler Memory Scale (Minimal 
Quotient between 20 and 44 years old: 40; Maximum Quotient between 20 and 44 years 
old: 136); TMT: Trail Making Test—Part B (medium execution time: 60 seconds); 
VFT: Verbal Fluency Test (Total number of produced words); FFRT: Familiar Faces 
Recognition Test (4 points for each sub-test: age perception, occupation, and emotion. 
Total: 12 points); MSS: Social and Emotional Maladjustment Scale (minimum. 7: 
absence of social maladjustment to maximum.49: intense maladjustment); N/A: Not 
Applicable. 
*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤.01; ***p ≤.001 (significance obtained using Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test). 
 
1.4  Stimuli and tasks 
1.4.1  Social emotion recognition task 
In order to assess participants’ ability to recognize social emotions through facial 
expressions, a Go/No-Go Task was designed using Presentation 0.7 software 
(http://nbs.neurobs.com/presentation) to present stimuli and register answer 
accuracy and reaction times. 
The stimuli used in this task was selected from Martins and Reis (2007) and consisted 
of black and white photographs with 44.46cm x 50cm depicting the face of an actor 
expressing one social emotion. Three actors were used to represent three social 
emotions (arrogance, jealousy and guilt) as well as a neutral expression. Pictures were 
selected after being evaluated by independent judges; only pictures with higher inter-
rater agreement rates were used (Krippendorff’s alpha > .7). 
The Go/No-Go task was organized in three blocks corresponding to each social emotion 
used in the study. Each block consisted of 24 stimuli: twelve (50%) represented the 
target emotion of the block (e.g., arrogance)—Go response—and twelve (50%) were 
distractors (four photos representative of neutral expression and eight photos 
representative of the other two social emotions)—No Go response. The three blocks 
presented sequentially always in the same order, separated by an interval of two 
minutes. Before each block and the next, participants were instructed which emotion 
they had to identify in the stimulus sequence. They were told to observe carefully each 
photograph presented in the sequence and, once they detect the target expression, they 
had to press a key as quickly as possible. Instructions were presented to participants 
during the training block, and were refreshed for each different experimental block. 
Each trial begins with a fixation cross, followed by one emotional stimulus presented 
for 500 ms. Then, a question mark (?) appeared for 1750 ms, the maximum time 
allowed to decide if the emotional stimulus presented corresponded to the block target 
emotion. Participants were instructed to press the key space whenever they identified 
the target emotion of each block. Once the response time limit expired, the next trial 
started automatically. Accuracy rates and reaction times were registered. In total, each 
participant responded to 72 trials; the score “1” was given for each correct answer (total 
score: minimum = 0; maximum = 36). 
1.4.2  Moral judgement task  
For the present study we adapted to Portuguese the 50 dilemmas originally created by 
Greene and colleagues (2004) and frequently used in the literature (see for example, 
Koenigs et al., 2007). The authors subdivided this original set of dilemmas in three 
categories: personal moral, impersonal moral and non-moral.
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In order to validate the classification imposed by the authors, an independent sample of 
ten judges rated the Portuguese version of each dilemma in terms of its emotional 
intensity using a seven-point scale (1—low emotional intensity; 7—high emotional 
intensity). The actions described in personal moral dilemmas were considered 
emotionally more intense than the actions described in impersonal moral dilemmas 
(mean ± sd: 5.71 ± 0.70 and M = 2.21 ± 0.47, respectively, computed across the 
dilemmas after averaging across subjects for each dilemma; Cohen’s d = 5.86; t = 3.25, 
p ≤ .001). 
Twenty-two dilemmas were selected for the present study, six of which correspond to 
non-moral dilemmas, six to impersonal moral dilemmas and ten to personal moral 
dilemmas. Although participants respond to the three types of dilemmas, we only used 
moral personal dilemmas data.
3
 Stimuli were randomised in three different presentation 
orders. At the beginning of each trial, a cross (+) appears on the computer screen for 
500 ms followed by the dilemma in text format (no time limit was imposed for reading 
the dilemma); when the participant finished reading the text, he will press a key in order 
to advance to the question they had to respond. This question was displayed in the 
screen for a maximum of 250 ms and the participant had to answer “yes” or “no”. The 
score “1” was assigned for each affirmative answer (“yes” responses always indicated 
commission of the proposed action). We use Presentation Software (version 0.7, 
http://nbs.neurobs.com/presentation) on a Samtron 73v computer for dilemmas 
presentation and for accuracy and response time registration. 
1.4.3  Procedure 
All participants were Portuguese native speakers and were assessed in a quiet laboratory 
room of the University of Algarve. Two individual sessions were arranged for each 
participant, with mean time duration of 180 minutes. Informed consent was obtained 
from all subjects after the main objective of the study had been explained. At the 
beginning, participants filled in a demographic questionnaire, where they also had to 
provide neurological and medical information. Afterwards, the battery of cognitive tests 
described above was introduced. In the end, all participants performed the visual 
emotion recognition task and the moral judgment task. 
2  Results 
2.1  Proportion of affirmative responses and response times 
We compute the proportion of affirmative answers given by subjects to the each 
personal dilemma. These dilemmas were constructed in such a way that an affirmative 
response (“yes”) corresponds to an utilitarian decision that implies damaging one of the 
parties (i.e., actors) of the story in order to maximize collective welfare. A prevalence of 
affirmative responses in this category of dilemmas would differ from the usual pattern 
found in healthy subjects that tended to respond negatively to these dilemmas (Koenigs, 
2007). There is a systematic higher preference for affirmative responses in the TBI 
group compared to the control group (Table 3). This difference is significant in six of 
the ten personal dilemmas, and in the hypothesized direction for all 10. 
 
Table 3: Proportion of affirmative answers to each personal dilemma. 
Personal dilemma TBI group (%) Control group (%) Fisher exact test p 
Architect 20.7 0.0 .004 
Smother for dollars 60.7 5.3 .000 
Plane crash 42.9 15.0 .013 
Crying baby 70.4 12.8 .000 
Euthanasia 72.4 64.9 .559 
Footbridge 32.1 15.8 .144 
Sacrifice 53.6 25.0 .022 
Hard times 10.7 5.1 .642 
Transplant 48.3 17.5 .008 
Vaccine test 65.4 51.2 .316 
  
Figure 1: Geometric mean response times (ms) for positive and negative answers to 
personal dilemmas (Control vs. TBI). Error bars are standard error, based on log 
transform. 
 
 
We converted the number of affirmative answers into a percentage and used it to 
evaluate subject’s tendency to give utilitarian responses. This composite measure is 
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .751). 
There is a large significant difference between groups concerning the average 
proportion of affirmative answers in personal dilemmas (Cohen’s d = 1.24; t = 5.22, df 
= 68, p < .001): TBI patients show a higher proportion of affirmative answers (mean ± 
sd: 47.0% ± 23.3%) when compared to healthy participants (mean ± sd: 21.4% ± 
17.8%). 
Response times were analyzed separately for affirmative and negative answers using 
repeated measures analyse of variance model using the group (Controls vs. TBI) as a 
between-subject factor and type of answer (affirmative vs. negative) as within-subject 
factor. Response times were logarithmized before analyses to stabilised variance. The 
results showed a significant effect of type of answer [F (1, 60) = 14.34, p < .001] due to 
faster response times for negative answers. The advantage of negative answers seems to 
depend on the group [interaction group x type of answer: F (1, 60) = 7.58, p = .008]: 
TBI participants spent the same time deciding for yes and no responses (time difference 
= 32ms; Cohen’s d = 0.09; t = 0.71, df = 27, p = .483); however, no-responses were 
significantly faster than yes-responses in healthy group (time difference = 2112ms; 
Cohen’s d = 0.72; t = 4.79, df = 33, p < .001; see Figure 1). This interaction can be 
understood by assuming that the more frequent (hence more dominant) response is 
faster (Baron, Gürçay, Moore, & Starcke, K., in press): for the TBI group the two 
responses were about equally frequent, but for the healthy group the negative response 
was much more frequent. 
2.2  Proportion of affirmative responses and response times according to 
the lateralization of the frontal brain lesion 
As documented in the literature, there are differences in emotion recognition patterns 
according to hemispheric lateralization of the lesion (left, right or bilateral). Given this, 
we classified all participants according to the presence or absence of lesion into four 
subgroups: one subgroup exclusively with right frontal lesions (n = 11), one group with 
exclusively left frontal lesion (n = 10), a sub-group with bilateral lesion (n = 8) and a 
healthy sub-group (n = 41). The proportions of affirmative responses on personal 
dilemmas was analysed using a two-way ANOVA with right hemisphere lesion (present 
vs. absent) and left hemisphere (present vs. absent) as between-subject factors. The 
results showed a large significant effect of right-hemisphere [F (1, 66) = 13.86, p < 
.001]: participants with frontal right lesion (exclusively right frontal lesion and bilateral 
lesion) gave a higher percentage of affirmative responses compared to participants 
without right lesion (control participants and exclusively left frontal lesion participants) 
(mean percentages: 51.1% versus 24.9%, Cohen’s d = 1.24). The presence of left 
hemisphere lesion seems to have a medium but no significant effect on the percentage 
of affirmative responses to personal dilemmas [F (1, 60) = 1.0, p = .173; mean 
percentages: 43.2% versus 27.8%; Cohen’s d = 0.66]. 
The analysis of response times showed a significant effect of the type of answer [F (1, 
58) = 4.5, p = .038], resulting from faster times for negative responses. Although the 
presence of any lesion increase response times, this effect is close to significant only for 
right hemisphere lesions [F (1, 58) = 3.9, p = .054]. However, the effect of left lesions 
seems to be similar for affirmative and negative answers [F (1, 58) = 2.2, p = .147]. 
2.3  Proportion of affirmative responses among TBI subjects according 
frontal region affected 
In order to further investigate the association between lesion location and participants’ 
performance on judging personal moral dilemmas, we sub-divided the TBI group in 
three sub-groups according to the frontal cortex region affected: orbitofrontal (n = 8), 
medial (n = 3) and dorsolateral regions (n = 18). The nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test 
identified a significant difference between groups regarding their performance on the 
task (H = 7.40, df = 2, p = .025). A post-hoc analysis using a Mann-Whitney test 
indicates that the difference results from a lower proportion of affirmative answers in 
the dorsolateral group compared to the other two groups (p < .05). 
2.4  Correlations with social emotion recognition 
Given the close relationship described in the literature between moral judgment and 
emotional processing, we looked for the existence of an association between the 
proportion of affirmative responses on personal dilemmas and the performance on a 
visual social emotion recognition task. The results suggest a negative association 
between these two tasks (Pearson r = −.374, p = .003), indicating that, when the answer 
to the personal moral dilemmas is more utilitarian, performance on the social emotion 
recognition task is worse. We also found a reduction in social emotion recognition in 
the TBI group (r = −.607, t(58) = −5.82, p < .001).4 
3  Discussion 
The pattern of impaired moral and social behaviour consistently observed in certain 
brain injured subjects stimulated, over the last decades, a significantly increasing 
amount of research studies oriented not only to identifying cerebral correlates for social 
emotion processing and moral judgment but also to see how these two processes are 
related. Some of these studies (for example, Greene et al., 2004, and Koenigs et al., 
2007) found an atypical social and moral behavioural pattern in subjects with frontal 
brain lesions and suggested a possible association between this pattern and impaired 
social emotion processing and moral judgment. Although there is some work developed 
in this field, few studies were dedicated to the performance of TBI patients on social 
emotion recognition and moral judgment and even less to the association between these 
two tasks in these patients. 
We examined how frontal TBI subjects performed on a set of highly emotional moral 
dilemmas and compared their results with those of a matched group of healthy 
participants. The results showed that the TBI group had a higher proportion of 
affirmative responses in personal moral dilemmas compared to controls. These results 
are similar to those obtained by other authors (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Koenigs et al., 
2007), and are explained by the nature of the particular type of dilemma used. When 
confronted with a moral dilemma that pit compelling considerations of aggregate 
welfare against highly emotionally aversive behaviour, frontal TBI patients decide to 
secure the welfare of the collective even if it means sacrificing someone. This response 
pattern suggests a diminished responsivity to the emotional load of the dilemma, 
allowing them to respond to utilitarian considerations without the emotional conflict 
that leads most healthy subjects to respond negatively to these dilemmas. 
The analysis of response times supports the previous interpretation: although TBI 
patients showed longer response times than controls, there was no time difference 
between affirmative and negative responses. But controls were clearly faster when they 
answered negatively to personal dilemmas than when they gave an affirmative response. 
The longer times in affirmative/utilitarian responses given by healthy subjects suggest 
sensitivity to the high emotional load of the dilemma not observed in the brain damaged 
group, which resulted in conflict. 
Ciaramelli and colleagues (2007), as well as Koenigs and colleagues (2007), proposed 
that proper social emotions processing is an indispensable prerequisite for normal 
resolution of moral actions, suggesting a common neuronal substrate for emotion 
processing and moral judgment. Moreover, impaired comprehension of social emotions 
in others (i.e., reduced ability to empathize), which is frequently observed in frontal 
brain damaged patients, severely compromises the ability to adequately judge moral 
dilemmas with high emotional intensity. Thus, subjects with frontal brain lesions tend to 
use only one utilitarian pattern when solving moral dilemmas, apparently revealing lack 
of moral conflict. Due to their impaired emotional processing, our TBI patients tend to 
assess personal moral dilemmas based solely on cognitive criterion, perhaps engaging in 
conscious abstract reasoning processes and cost-benefit analysis. In the control group, 
the sensitivity to dilemmas’ emotional load may have contributed to an intuitive and 
automatic emotional assessment of the dilemma that directs them to a fast negative 
response. 
Based on our results, and similarly to Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz (2007), we 
suggest the prefrontal cortex as an important regulator for moral judgment. 
Similarly to other studies (see for example, Tamietto et al., 2007), we also asked 
whether moral dilemmas assessment depended on the lateralization of the lesion in the 
prefrontal cortex. We found that the existence of a right-hemisphere lesion is 
significantly associated to a larger preference for utilitarian decision in personal moral 
dilemmas, as well as for longer response times. The presence of a left-hemisphere lesion 
may also have a positive medium contribution for utilitarian decisions, but its effect was 
not significant in our study. In spite of inter-hemispheric cooperation theory both for 
social emotions processing (Braun et al., 2005; Tamietto et al., 2007) and for moral 
judgment, we might suggest, following Demaree and colleagues (2005), that the right 
hemisphere may play a more decisive role than the left in moral judgments (at least their 
emotional aspect). 
Concerning the role of specific prefrontal cortex regions in moral judgment, Greene and 
colleagues (2004) and Koenigs and colleagues (2007) highlight the importance of the 
ventromedial cortex. When we divided our TBI group in orbitofrontal, ventromedial and 
dorsolateral subgroups, according to the localisation of the lesion, we verified that the 
preference for utilitarian responses was smaller in the dorsolateral subgroup. According 
to Ciaramelli and colleagues (2007) the ventromedial cortex is critical to take a firm 
stand against personal moral violations, perhaps by mediating or self-focused emotional 
reactions that affect moral decisions. 
We also sought to understand whether there was an association between the response 
pattern on moral dilemmas and performance on the visual recognition of social 
emotions (arrogance, jealousy and guilt). The results showed a negative association 
between the social emotions recognition and the proportion of utilitarian responses to 
personal moral dilemmas. These findings suggest that an atypical preference for 
utilitarian responses is associated with deficits in social emotion recognition, although 
recognition of emotion in faces is only part of the general emotional sensitivity that may 
be relevant. 
Although our TBI patients revealed more difficulties than the controls on moral 
judgment and social emotion recognition tasks, and in spite of the association between 
these two tasks for them, our results did not show any difficulties on cognitive tests. 
These results converge with those found by Burgess and colleagues (2006) who propose 
that subjects with frontal brain lesions are able to frequently accomplish high complex 
everyday tasks. Furthermore, these results suggest that the evaluation of emotional 
moral and non-emotional stimuli depend on different and independent neuronal circuits. 
Because it is described in the literature that TBI patients often display depressive 
symptoms, which could bias our interpretation of the data from moral judgment and 
social emotional recognition tasks, we addressed this potential problem through Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) and observed values representing only mild depression in 
the clinical group. According to Eslinger, Parkinson and Shamay (2002), some 
depression is expected in aware TBI patients because of their gradual disengagement 
from the society. Depressive symptoms did not seem to mediate the effect of TBI, 
however. Although the correlation between BDI and affirmative responses to personal 
dilemmas was substantial (r = .464, p < .001), a regression of the dilemma score on TBI 
and BDI found no significant effect of BDI, although the TBI coefficient was 
significant (p = .003).
5
 Thus, it would seem that the correlation of BDI with moral 
judgment is more likely the result of its correlation with TBI, rather than the cause of it. 
In conclusion, we believe that our results are consistent with the current model that 
supports joint action between the intuitive/emotional and the conscious/rational systems 
in moral judgment (Koenigs et al., 2007). Further investigation is necessary in order to 
obtain a more detailed characterization of the emotional system and its neural correlates. 
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1 
(1) Sagital Spin Echo T1 (22 cuts of 5mm), (2) Axial Turbo Spin Echo dual 
echo PD and T2 (22 cuts of 5 mm), (3) Axial Fluid Attenuated Inversion 
Recovery (Flair- 22 cuts of 5 mm), (4) Axial Fast Field Echo (Gradient echo) T2 
(22 cuts of 6 mm), (5) Axial Diffusion Weight (Gradient) Echo Diffusion (20 
cuts of 3mm), (6) Coronal Turbo Spin Echo T2 (25 cuts of 3mm), and (3) Axial 
3D Fast Field Echo T1 (200 cuts of 0.6mm). 
2 
Personal moral dilemmas (21 dilemmas; e.g., “Enemy soldiers invaded your 
village. [... ] You and some townspeople seek refuge in the cellar of a big house. 
[...] Your baby starts to cry very loud and you cover her/his mouth to silence 
her/ him. [...] In order to save yourself and the others you will have to stifle your 
child to death. In order to save your life and of the others would you choose to 
stifle your child?”); Impersonal moral dilemmas (11 dilemmas; e.g., “You’re 
walking down the street when you see a wallet on the floor. You open the wallet 
and find several hundred Euros in cash and a license of the owner. By the 
number of credit cards and other documents you realize that the owner of the 
wallet is rich. On the other hand, you have had enough tough financial periods 
and extra money would come in handy [...] Would you choose to send the wallet 
to the owner without the money?”); Non-moral dilemmas (18 dilemmas; e.g., 
“You decide to make chocolate cookies for yourself. [...] The recipe says to add 
nuts. However, you do not like nuts but like almonds. [...] In order to avoid 
eating nuts would you choose to replace them with the almonds?”). 
3 
Several authors use non-moral dilemmas and moral impersonal dilemmas as a 
kind of experimental control condition for responses to moral personal dilemmas 
(e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007; but see Kahane & Shackel, 2010,for a critical review 
of the use of these moral dilemmas in empirical studies). However, non-moral 
and moral impersonal dilemmas seem quite different from the personal 
dilemmas and from each other. For example, in some of the moral impersonal 
dilemmas used, an affirmative answer expressed a utilitarian position (e.g., the 
sculpture dilemma) while in others it expressed self-interest (e.g., the wallet 
dilemma). It is not clear what these dilemmas control for. We thus abandoned 
the analysis of non-moral and moral impersonal dilemmas. We note that brain 
damage did not affect responses to the omitted dilemmas in the slightest. 
4 
We can ask whether the reduction in social emotion score can account for the 
effect of TBI on affirmative answers to the dilemmas. Evidently it cannot. When 
the dilemma score was regressed on both the social emotion score and TBI, the 
coefficient for social emotion was not significant. A significant coefficient 
would be required to demonstrate mediation. The TBI coefficient remained 
significant (p = .004). This failure to find mediation, however, is still consistent 
with the possibility that the effect of TBI on social emotional responses in 
general do mediate its effect on moral judgment. The task we used may not fully 
measure the relevant aspects of social emotional responding, both because it was 
limited to recognition and because it was not perfectly reliable. 
5 
Moreover, the (unstandardized) coefficient for TBI was .19, only slightly less 
than .21, its coefficient in a regression without BDI. 
 
